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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature 0f the

A.

case.

In this case, the district court rewrote a promissory note for $648,500 (the

M) and

a

deed 0f trust that secured the Note (the Deed 0f Trust) based on a disputed oral representation.

The

district court

found the Note and the Deed 0f Trust were latently ambiguous because the

amount 0f the Note was more than
district court

something

the

amount loaned, Which “do[es] not make sense.” But

identiﬁed no language in the contracts that could be reasonably read to

different.

Nor

the

mean

did the district court offer a different interpretation t0 explain any

ambiguity. Rather, using the alleged oral representation, the district court “interpreted” the Note

and Deed of Trust

The

t0 include

district court’s

new

conditions that neither contract contained.

ﬁnding

that the

Note and Deed of Trust included conditions

omitted from the contracts was signiﬁcant. At
Porcello

pay

it.

trial,

was no dispute

there

(M) and Jennifer Porcello HeLifer) signed and agreed
new

Nonetheless, based 0n the

Estates of Annie Porcello (An_nie) and

beneﬁciaries of the
Jennifer had

Jennifer agreed t0

were unable

Anthony Porcello (My),

to satisfy the

Mark is Annie and Tony’s
buy a house

in

t0 obtain ﬁnancing.

were

Respondents Mark

pay the Note and did not

conditions, the district court concluded that Appellants

Deed of Trust, had no

no obligation

to

that

that

right t0 foreclose

Note and were not

son. Jennifer is

the holders 0f the

Note and

0n the deed because Mark and
in default.

Mark’s eX-Wife. While married, Mark and

Hayden Lake, Idaho

(the

Annie and Tony agreed

Hayden Lake house)

to loan

they need to close on the house, $3 12,044.32. But t0 loan

Mark and

for

$360,000 but

Jennifer the

money

money to Mark and Jennifer, Annie

and Tony had

to

borrow the money themselves. Mark arranged

short-term, high interest loan for $648,500

for

Annie and Tony t0 obtain a

from Legacy Group Capital (Legacy Group).

Why was the Legacy Group loan so much more than the money Mark and Jennifer
needed

to purchase the

Lake house

Tony had

t0

Hayden Lake house? The Legacy Group would not accept

as security for the loan.

T0

net the

the

Hayden

money Mark and Jennifer needed, Annie and

borrow against and cash out the equity they held

in

two houses, one they owned

in

Woodinville, Washington (the Woodinville house) and another in Indian Wells, California (the

Via Venito house). Ultimately, the Legacy Group loan included the money provided
Jennifer to close 0n the

Hayden Lake house, plus loan

t0

Mark and

and the pay-off for the Woodinville

fees

house’s existing mortgage.
Further complicating the matter

house as an investment and agreed

was

the Woodinville house.

to renovate

it

With

While there was a dispute over how much money the

how much they

Mark and

Annie and Tony bought the

Jennifer’s help

parties put into the

and then

sell

it.

Woodinville house and

should get out, there was no dispute that the parties meant t0 reconcile their

respective contributions from the equity in the house once

the parties intended

Mark and Jennifer to

it

sold.

The

district court

found that

receive $ 1 50,000 from Annie and Tony’s equity in the

Woodinville house for the purchase 0f the Hayden Lake house.

Annie and Tony were concerned about the

Group loan 0n Mark and
and Via Venito houses

Jennifer’s behalf.

t0 obtain the loan,

risk they

were undertaking with the Legacy

They were cashing out

and they wanted

repaid them. Before providing them With the

their equity in the

t0 ensure that

Mark and

money from the Legacy Group

loan,

Woodinville

Jennifer

Annie and

Tony required Mark and Jennifer to sign the Note, which contained the same repayment terms as
the Legacy Group loan. Annie and Tony also required that they sign the Deed of Trust on the
Hayden Lake house, securing the Note and any future advances made to Mark and Jennifer while
they owned the house. Mark and Jennifer signed the Note and Deed of Trust, and Annie and
Tony provided them with $312,044.32 to close on the Hayden Lake house.
At trial, there was no dispute that Mark and Jennifer purchased the Hayden Lake house
with money loaned by Annie and Tony, that they agreed to pay the Note, that they secured the
Note (plus future advances) with the Deed of Trust, and that they paid none of the principal on
the Note. But according to Mark and Jennifer, they had no obligation to pay the Note because
Annie and Tony’s attorney told them they would own the Hayden Lake house “free and clear”
when the Woodinville house sold and the Legacy Group loan was repaid.
The Note and Deed of Trust, however, do not contain those conditions. Relying on Mark
and Jennifer’s self-serving testimony, the district court interpreted the contracts to include them
anyway. The Legacy Group loan was ultimately repaid by Annie and Tony by taking out two
additional mortgages, one on the Woodinville house and another on the Via Venito house. Later
the Woodinville house sold. Because the house was sold and Legacy Group loan was repaid, the
district court concluded Mark and Jennifer were not in default and Annie and Tony could not
foreclose on the Deed of Trust. The district court did not consider what Mark and Jennifer owed.
The district court’s use of parol evidence to add conditions to the Note and Deed of Trust
was improper. A seemingly unfair contract does not create a latent ambiguity. There must be
language that can be reasonably interpreted to have multiple meanings, and there is none in the
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Note or Deed of Trust. The district court identified no such language and did not interpret the
contracts to offer an alternative interpretation of any uncertain term. The district court simply
added conditions under the guise of interpreting a latent ambiguity. That was error.
In addition, the district court’s interpretation of the Note and Deed of Trust is not
supported by substantial and competent evidence. The parties could not have intended for the
Woodinville house, once sold, to satisfy the Legacy Group loan because, as the district court
recognized, it could not. Further, Mark and Jennifer acquired the Hayden Lake house without
paying any of the principal on the Note or the Legacy Group loan. That windfall is an
implausible result because, as the district court also found, Annie and Tony were entitled to
recoup their equity in the Woodinville house. They never did. Instead they were encumbered by
more debt, while Mark and Jennifer got the Hayden Lake house for free.
Finally, the district court erred in finding that the Deed of Trust did not secure future
loans and advances Annie and Tony made to Mark and Jennifer while they were record owners
of the Hayden Lake house. The Deed of Trust expressly secured all such future loans and
advances, no matter the purpose. The district court should have enforced the parties’ intent and
considered Annie and Tony’s additional loans to Mark while he owned the Hayden Lake house
in considering whether Annie and Tony were entitled to foreclose the Deed of Trust.
Annie and Tony ask that the Court reverse the district court, vacate the judgment, and
remand for the district court to apply the Note and Deed of Trust as written, to find Mark and
Jennifer were in default under the Note, and decide what amount is owed to Annie and Tony.
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Statement 0f facts and course 0f proceedings.

B.

Annie and Tony had one son, Mark, who was married

1.

Annie and Tony were married 66

years. Tr. 760:2-3 (Tony).1

2017. Tr. 42:21-24 (Mark). Tony died after
respective estates, and for ease 0f reference,

granddaughter, Kalyn Porcello (K_alm),

is

trial,

in July 2018.

we refer to them

Tr.

Annie and Tony, and was involved

As

discussed

(now

(Mark).

Mark and Jennifer were married twice, from 2003

2013

December 2017.
For

in

February

now represented by their

and

my. Their

Mark had three
later,

children With

Kalyn worked

for

in the transactions that give rise t0 this case.

also has additional children with his third wife, Jennifer

Id.; Tr.

are

m

760:4-10 (Tony).

his ﬁrst Wife, including Kalyn. Tr. 4419-15 (Mark).

t0

as

Annie died

the personal representative 0f their estates.

Annie and Tony had one son, Mark.

assisted

They

to Jennifer.

t0

Mark

Jennifer Maggard). Tr. 44:23-46:3

2007 and again from November

435:21-436:15 (Jennifer); see also

many years, Annie and Tony operated

Mark,

COE 509

(EX. 12).

a retail jewelry business in Bellevue,

Washington. Tr. 760:1 1-19 (Tony); Tr. 6311-5 (Mark). Annie handled the ﬁnances for the
business, as well as their personal ﬁnances, until a

815: 19-817z23 (Tony); Tr. 105 1 :4-1052:9 (Kalyn).

few years before her death.

Mark also

Tr. 760222-76225,

ran a business buying and selling

second-hand jewelry and watches. Tr. 4929-22, 61 125-6315 (Mark). Mark’s business operated

under the name Mark Porcello,

1

Inc.,

dba Porcello Estate Buyers (MP1).

The Clerk’s Record on Appeal

offered at

trial

is

cited as

“g” The

are included in the Certiﬁcate of Exhibits,

COE are t0 the Certiﬁcate of Exhibits page number.

exhibits

Which

is

Id.

and deposition

cited as

transcripts

“COE.” A11

The Transcript 0n Appeal

is

cites t0

cited as

“h”

2.

Annie and Tony purchased the Woodinville house.
a.

Annie and Tony purchased the house as an investment.

This case arises because Mark needed money to buy various residential properties and
was unable to obtain financing himself. See Tr. 82:4-83:1 (Mark); Tr. 610:16-24 (Jennifer). He
would ask Annie for the money he needed. See Tr. 82:4-83:1, 128:11-129:2, 270:6-20 (Mark);
Tr. 610:16-24 (Jennifer); Tr. 822:16-824:8, 914:11-17 (Tony). Annie would provide the
financing and acquire title to the property. See Tr. 76:19-77:12, 79:11-91:9 (Mark); Tr. 822:16823:10 (Tony). Annie expected to be repaid. Tr. 817:9-818:19, 826:4-18 (Tony).
These arrangements included a house in Woodinville, Washington. Jennifer wanted to
buy the house but could not obtain financing, and Mark turned to Annie. Tr. 104:1-12 (Mark);
Tr. 442:18-445:9 (Jennifer). Annie agreed to purchase the Woodinville house and allow Mark
and Jennifer to live there, so long as they covered the mortgage payments. Tr. 108:5-109:7,
311:14-312:23 (Mark); Tr. 1141:23-1143:9 (Kalyn).
In January 2012, Annie and Tony bought the Woodinville house for $401,000. COE 491
(Ex. 3). They placed $6,000 in escrow, made a down payment of $93,394.40, and obtained a 30year conventional mortgage for the rest. Id.; Tr. 105:2-106:7, 108:5-13 (Mark); Tr. 818:20-819:4
(Tony); Tr. 1158:5-1159:2 (Kalyn). Title was in Annie and Tony’s names. See COE 491 (Ex. 3).
Yet, at trial, Jennifer claimed that “the house was mine.” Tr. 445:20-22, 450:19-24 (Jennifer).
Likewise, Mark testified that Annie helped buy the house “[f]or me.” Tr. 104:7-12 (Mark).
In any event, Annie and Mark agreed to fix up the Woodinville house and eventually sell
it. Tr. 134:19-135:10, 311:14-312:16 (Mark); Tr. 474:5-10 (Jennifer). They also foresaw settling
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their respective contributions in the house and sharing in the proceeds once the house sold.
According to Mark, their contributions were roughly equal, and they planned to split the profits
once the Woodinville house sold. Tr. 150:18-151:8, 1483:8-1484:2, 1485:1-6 (Mark). According
to Kalyn, the arrangement called for Annie and Tony and Mark and Jennifer to recoup the money
they invested in the house. Tr. 1282:7-19, 1308:5-1309:4 (Kalyn).
b.

The parties disputed their respective contributions to the purchase
and renovation of the house.

Mark and Jennifer had reconciled, and they and their children moved into the
Woodinville house in February 2012. Tr. 109:5-24 (Mark). But first the house needed work.
Mark and Jennifer hired contractors to replace the carpet, update the bathrooms, paint, and put on
a new roof. Tr. 110:25-114:9 (Mark); Tr. 451:3-453:4 (Jennifer). Jennifer also helped, planning
the renovations and working in the house and yard. Tr. 453:12-454:22 (Jennifer).
At trial, there was no dispute that Annie and Tony put money into the Woodinville house,
as did Mark and Jennifer. See Tr. 312:12-23, 1482:3-1484:7 (Mark); Tr. 1094:17-1095:17,
1274:4-7 (Kalyn). But how much was contested. For example, Mark thought he paid Annie for
the escrow payment and “maybe close to 40,000” for a portion of the $93,394.40 down payment,
perhaps in cash, jewelry, or diamonds, but he had no documentation for either payment. Tr.
105:2-107:11, 362:10-363:23, 1482:3-1484:7 (Mark). Jennifer thought, mistakenly, that Mark
had paid the entire down payment. Tr. 619:3-12, 628 (Jennifer).
Kalyn never saw any documentation to support Mark’s story. During this time, she was
working closely with Mark, managing MPI’s inventory, and supervising MPI’s books. Tr.
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1028:7-1047:21, 1074:8-11 (Kalyn); see also Tr. 308:13-310:3 (Mark). Mark’s personal finances
were intertwined with MPI, and she was familiar with both. Tr. 1032:13-23, 1036:10-25 (Kalyn).
Kalyn never saw any personal or business record to reflect a $40,0000 payment to Annie. Tr.
1090:23-1092:1, 1092:7-1094:2, 1125:23-1126:20, 1394:15-1395:3 (Kalyn). The first time she
heard Mark’s claim was at trial. Tr. 1126:21-23 (Kalyn).
There were also disputes over who paid the mortgage on the Woodinville house and who
paid for the renovations. As for the mortgage, Mark and Jennifer claimed they paid all the
mortgage payments. Tr. 108:14-19, 118:24-119:6 (Mark); see also Tr. 631:6-632:16 (Jennifer).
The district court found that was not true. R. 460. At first, Mark paid Annie the mortgage
payments. Tr. 380:23-381:4 (Mark); Tr. 1105:7-1106:18, 1141:23-1144:12 (Kalyn). But in early
2013, Jennifer obtained a no contact order against him, and Mark moved out of the Woodinville
house. Tr. 114:13-20 (Mark); Tr. 459:5-25 (Jennifer).
From April to October 2013, Annie made the mortgage payments. Tr. 1142:5-1144:12
(Kalyn). In November 2013, Jennifer and Mark remarried. Tr. 121:1-7 (Mark); Tr. 466:12-23
(Jennifer). Mark resumed paying the mortgage, paying the bank directly from his MPI business
account. Tr. 108:5-109:3, 214:14-217:2 (Mark); Tr. 1105:10-22, 1142:5-21, 1144:5-12, 1273:211274:3 (Kalyn). MPI’s accounting ledgers confirm this. COE 545 (Ex. 19); COE 542 (Ex. 17).
As for the renovations to the Woodinville house, Mark paid for a lot of the work. Tr.
110:25-115:6 (Mark); Tr. 456:3-457:21 (Jennifer). Jennifer also claimed to pay “approximately
$40,000” for the renovations but later stated she could not “recall the exact figure” and that “[i]t
would probably be approximately 30, 40.” Tr. 458:22-459:4, 522:4-8, 638:11-16 (Jennifer). But

-8-

as with Mark’s alleged down payment on the house, there was no documentation to support her
claim. Tr. 364:9-14 (Mark); Tr. 518:24-519:18 (Jennifer).
At trial, Mark and Jennifer also claimed that Annie did not reimburse them or contribute
to the renovations. Tr. 114:21-115:13, 312:17-313:15 (Mark); Tr. 510:17-511:7 (Jennifer). Yet at
the same time, Mark acknowledged that he and Annie put in approximately the same amount to
remodel the house and that he and Annie planned to split the profits from the Woodinville house
when it sold. Tr. 1483:8-1485:6 (Mark). The district court found that Annie reimbursed Mark for
some of the cost of renovating the Woodinville house. R. 460.
c.

An arbitrator found Jennifer had no interest in the Woodinville
house.

The dispute over the parties’ respective contributions to the Woodinville house came to a
head after Mark moved out of the house in early 2013. Annie sent Jennifer an eviction notice
because she was not paying rent. Tr. 1145:1-8 (Kalyn); see also Tr. 460:21-461:7 (Jennifer).
During the same time, Mark and Jennifer were involved in custody issues in Washington state
court, which were referred to formal arbitration before a retired King County, Washington
superior court judge. Tr. 116:22-117:15 (Mark); Tr. 460:21-461:25 (Jennifer).
Annie’s eviction notice became wrapped up in the arbitration, and Jennifer agreed to
arbitrate that issue too. Tr. 462:1-10 (Jennifer). Jennifer made a claim for the Woodinville house
and sought equitable reimbursement. Tr. 117:13-21 (Mark); Tr. 462:22-25 (Jennifer). Annie and
Jennifer both submitted documentation to support their claims to the house. Tr. 518:9-23
(Jennifer); Tr. 1118:17-119:12, 1145:9-1146:2 (Kalyn). Kalyn attended the arbitration with
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Annie; Mark was also present. Tr. 381:12-15 (Mark); Tr. 1118:17-1120:6 (Kalyn).
According to Kalyn, during the arbitration, Mark never claimed that he contributed
$40,000 to the down payment on the Woodinville house, and he admitted that Annie reimbursed
him for all the remodeling costs. Tr. 1125:12-1127:22, 1128:18-1132:17, 1393:25-1397:13
(Kalyn). In August 2013, the arbitrator issued an order requiring Jennifer to vacate the
Woodinville house and denying “[a]ll equitable lien claims, all claims for reimbursement, and all
other monetary claims of any nature by Ms. Maggard.” COE 745-46 (Ex. AAA). Jennifer moved
out of the house, and Annie and Tony listed the house for sale. Tr. 1343:19-1344:11 (Kalyn).
3.

Mark and Jennifer contracted to buy the Hayden Lake house.

Mark and Jennifer remarried in late 2013 and decided to move to Idaho. Jennifer found a
house in Hayden Lake, Idaho. See Tr. 121:21-122:2 (Mark); Tr. 467:13-24 (Jennifer); COE 499
(Ex. 4). In April 2014, they entered into a purchase and sale agreement to buy the house for
$360,000. COE 494-500 (Ex. 4). Mark paid $20,000 in non-refundable earnest money. COE
494-95 (Ex. 4); Tr. 125:5-18 (Mark). Closing was scheduled for July 31, 2016. COE 499 (Ex. 4).
They moved into the Hayden Lake house and began paying rent. COE 501 (Ex. 4). The earnest
money and a portion of the rent were applied as a down payment. COE 495 (Ex. 4).
4.

Mark and Jennifer prepared the Woodinville house for sale.

Around the same time, Annie discussed with Mark making another push to sell the
Woodinville house. Tr. 134:12-135:5 (Mark). In the summer of 2014, Mark and Jennifer
returned to Woodinville to update the house for sale. See Tr. 135:11-14, 138:18-23 (Mark); Tr.
474:1-13 (Jennifer). But before agreeing to work on the house, Jennifer insisted on some type of
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agreement from Annie to ensure she received something for the new work that needed to be
done. Tr. 475:18-477:8, 494:6-17 (Jennifer).
Jennifer testified that Annie wrote her a note. Tr. 475:19-477:22 (Jennifer). The note,
dated July 1, 2014, is addressed “To Whom It May Concern” and reads: “When the house in
Woodinville sells …[,] I will have $150,000.00 transferred for the purchase of the home at 1663
Northwood Dr., Hayden, Idaho 83835.” COE 503 (Ex. 6). Jennifer viewed Annie’s note as a
promise to provide $150,000 towards the purchase of the Hayden Lake house. Tr. 475:22-24
(Jennifer). Mark testified the note was Annie’s calculation of what Mark had invested in the
Woodinville house. Tr. 150:18-151:8 (Mark).
Mark and Jennifer had the kitchen renovated, the floors repaired, the interior repainted,
and the concrete driveway redone. Tr. 135:19-136:8 (Mark); Tr. 494:18-495:25 (Jennifer).
Jennifer worked on the yard. Tr. 136:9-15 (Mark). Mark and Jennifer testified they paid for all
this additional work. Tr. 114:21-115:13 (Mark); Tr. 495:10-25, 526:11-17 (Jennifer). Jennifer
claimed they paid “between thirty and forty-five thousand” or “[t]hirty-eight, 40 something like
that” for the renovations. Tr. 644:16-645:1 (Jennifer). Mark never stated how much he
contributed to the new renovations, but all together, he thought he “had, let’s say, 240 or 50
thousand into it.” Tr. 208:9-11 (Mark); see also Tr. 115:14-116:3 (Mark). As before, their claims
were not documented. Tr. 364:9-14 (Mark).
Considering all of the evidence, the district court found that the amounts Annie and Mark
invested in the Woodinville house in the summer of 2014 were “roughly equal,” that Jennifer
contributed sweat equity in the renovations, and that Annie wrote the July 1, 2014 note
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“intending to repay

Mark and

home and designating

$150,000 g0 toward payment 0f the Hayden home.” R. 464-65.

that the

Mark extended

5.

In the meantime,

July 3

Jennifer for their equity in the Woodinville

the closing date 0n the

Mark and

Jennifer were unable to close on the

2014. Tr. 126: 19-24 (Mark). In August 2014,

1,

money and $5,000

COE 502

Hayden Lake

Mark payed

in additional rent to extend the closing

(EX. 5); Tr. 127:20-128: 10 (Mark).

were non-reﬁmdable and credited

t0 the

As

house.

Hayden Lake house by

another $15,000 in earnest

from July 31

t0

September

COE

502 (EX.

2014.

money and rent

before, the additional earnest

purchase price.

4,

5).

0f closing, Mark and Jennifer would owe $3 12,044.32 on the Hayden Lake

By the time

house. Id. Mark, however, could not secure ﬁnancing. Tr. 128:1 1-24 (Mark). Neither could
Jennifer.

See Tr. 100225-10226 (Mark); Tr. 47226-19 (Jennifer). Mark spoke t0 his friend Scott

Rerucha

at

Mark and

Legacy Group

Capital,

LLC

Jennifer risked losing the

(Legacy Group),

to

no

down-payment monies he had paid on

1156:22-1 157: 19, 1321 :6-16 (Kalyn). Mark, then, did “[W]hat

mom.”

I

always

1-24 (Mark).

the house. See Tr.

did. I’d

go talk

t0

my

Tr. 128225-12922 (Mark).

6.

Annie and Tony obtained the Legacy Group loan
Jennifer money to buy the Hayden Lake house.

Annie agreed
129: 14-24 (Mark).

company

to help

T0

from Scott Rerucha
lending

avail. Tr. 128:1

at

Mark and Jennifer

acquire ﬁnancing,

Legacy Group.

operating in Washington.

not operate in Idaho and would not lend

get ﬁnancing for the

Mark arranged

Tr. 130:

1

t0 reloan

for

Mark and

Hayden Lake house.

Annie and Tony

t0 obtain a loan

1-132:2 (Mark). Legacy Group

COE

10:

1
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is

a private

8-25 (Rerucha Dep.). But the

money 0n the Hayden Lake

Tr.

company did

house. Tr. 15613-4 (Mark);

COE

112:3-10 (Rerucha Dep.).

Needing the Legacy Group

to close the loan quickly,

Mark devised

a plan for Annie and

Tony t0 cash

out the equity in the Woodinville house and for the Legacy Group t0 obtain a ﬁrst

lien position

on the house.

Tr. 155:8-156: 10 (Mark); see also Tr. 839: 1-14 (Tony).

0n the Woodinville house was just over $270,000.
the mortgage off, there

Mark and

was not enough equity

Jennifer needed to

Tr. 15213-23 (Mark).

in the

But even

The mortgage

after

Woodinville house to obtain the

buy the Hayden Lake house.

Tr. 155:8-156: 10 (Mark);

paying

money

COE

111:18—1 12:15 (Rerucha Dep.).

Mark called Annie and Tony’s

attorney, Joe Mijich, about a property

Indian Wells, California (the Via Venito house).

96922 (Parker). Joe
(Parker). Joe

is

COE

an estate planning attorney.

had placed the Via Venito house

Annie owned

in

179:24-180211 (Mijich Dep.); Tr. 968: 19-

COE

172215-20 (Mijich Dep.); Tr. 96621-5

in a trust for

Annie and Tony’s beneﬁt.

COE

173: 14-178zl6 (Mijich Dep.); see also Tr. 74:20-23, 87:19-23, 301:1 1-17 (Mark).

Mark wanted t0 know
for a loan.

COE

if the

Via Venito house, being

in a trust, could

179224-18129 (Mijich Dep.); Tr. 298:9-14 (Mark). Joe told

be used as

Mark it

collateral

could.

COE

180:7-9 (Mijich Dep.); see also Tr. 298:9-22 (Mark). Annie held no debt on the Via Venito
house. See Tr. 297: 1-7 (Mark); see also Tr. 1189:23-1 190:4 (Kalyn). Ultimately,
for

Annie and Tony

t0 obtain a

the Woodinville house and the

Kalyn was

still

Mark arranged

$648,500 loan from the Legacy Group, cross—collateralized by

Via Venito house.

working for

MPI and was

Hayden Lake house and working With

Tr.

155:8-156:10 (Mark).

helping

Mark facilitate

the purchase of the

Scott Rerucha. Tr. 1149:22-1 154: 16 (Kalyn). She
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was

also

assisting

began

Annie and Tony with

t0 decline,

by 2015.

Id.

their ﬁnances. Tr.

Kalyn became more involved

in

105 1 :4-1059: 14 (Kalyn). As Annie’s health

Annie and Tony’s ﬁnances, taking them over

Kalyn helped them With the application

for the

Legacy Group loan and closing on

the loan. Tr. 1149:22-1 154: 16, 1325:23-1326:10 (Kalyn).

The Legacy Group loan was $648,500 because
for

Mark and Jennifer to buy the Hayden Lake

house.

that is

COE

What

it

took t0 net enough

money

111:18—1 12:15 (Rerucha Dep.). The

loan included: (1) $17,315.50 in settlement charges; (2) $270,462 to pay off the Woodinville

house mortgage;
(4)

Mark and

Jennifer to purchase the

$48,677.62 t0 be distributed to Annie and Tony.

distributed

at

(3) $3 12,044.32 for

0n September

2,

COE 692-698

2014, and due in 90 days.

12% and interest—only payments were due monthly.
7.

1d,; Tr.

Hayden Lake house; and

(EX. V).

The loan was

1327: 1-14 (Kalyn). Interest

was

Tr. 1327: 1-14 (Kalyn).

Annie and Tony required Mark and Jennifer t0 sign the Note and Deed 0f
Trust before receiving money from the Legacy Group loan.
Joe Mijich prepared the Note and Deed of Trust.

a.

Before agreeing t0 the Legacy Group loan, Annie and Tony spoke with Scott Rerucha
the

Legacy Group.

COE

101 12-24 (Rerucha Dep.).

they were undertaking on

paid them back.

COE

:

Mark and

They were concerned about

Jennifer’s behalf and

wanted

t0 ensure

(Rerucha Dep.). Annie and Tony called Joe Mijich.

Annie and Tony asked Joe

same terms

as the

at

the level 0f risk

Mark and

Jennifer

101:25-102:21, 10329-10426 (Rerucha Dep.); Tr. 817:9-818: 19, 832:1 1-19

(Tony). Scott Rerucha told them they needed t0 speak With their attorney.

the

set

to draft a

Legacy Group loan

COE

COE

101 225-10427

179:15-19 (Mijich Dep.).

promissory note for Mark and Jennifer t0 sign with

(the

Note) and a deed 0f trust 0n the Hayden Lake
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house (the Deed of Trust), as security for the Note.

:

mirror the Legacy Group loan. See
In

it,

COE 609

182:17-183215, 187:4-188z6, 190: 16-

Mark and

191 16 (Mijich Dep.); Tr. 967: 13-968117 (Parker).

Hayden Lake house 0n September 4, 2014. Joe

COE

Jennifer were due t0 close

on the

drafted the Note, dated September 3, 2014, t0

(EX. F);

Mark and Jennifer would, jointly and

COE

190: 16-191 :16 (Mijich Dep.).

severally,

promise to pay t0 the order 0f Anthony J. Porcello and Annie C.
Porcello, husband and Wife (“Holder”), the principal sum 0f Six

Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and N0
Cents ($648,500.00) in lawful money of the United States 0f
American [sic] With interest thereon at the rate 0f twelve percent
per

COE 609
monthly.

(EX. F).

Id.

annum from August
It

was payable

29, 2014,

in full

computed on a 365/360

0n November 29, 2014, With

interest-only

payments due

The Note was “secured by a Deed of Trust of even date executed by the

undersigned 0n certain real estate property described therein.”

The Deed of Trust incorporates
the indebtedness evidenced

the

basis.

sum of Six Hundred

Note and

by the Beneﬁciary herein

November

29, 2014.”

to the Grantor herein, or

any purpose.”

sums
any or

as

No

COE 610 (EX.

Cents

G). In addition, the

may hereafter be

either

in

loaned 0r advanced

0f them, while record owner 0f

Id.

Joe also prepared instructions for the

COE 269:21-270z23

purpose to secure “payment 0f

Forty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and

secures “payment 0f all such further

the present interest, for

states as its

by a promissory note, 0f even date herewith, executed by Grantor

($648,500.00), With ﬁnal payment due

Deed 0f Trust

the

Id.

title

company and had Annie and Tony

sign them.

(Mijich Dep.); Tr. 993213-99424 (Parker). The instructions informed the
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title

company that Annie and Tony were providing “$312,044.32 for title purchase of the above
reference property on behalf of Mark Porcello and Jennifer Porcello.” COE 608 (Ex. E). Also the
title company could deliver the funds to the seller “only after the Note and Deed of Trust
previously sent to you by our attorney are signed by both parties, Mark and Jennifer Porcello;
after which you are to record the Deed of Trust.” Id.
b.

Mark signed the Note and Deed of Trust and closed on the Hayden
Lake house on September 3.

On September 3, Mark and Jennifer went to the title company to close on the Hayden
Lake house. Mark signed the Note and the Deed of Trust. COE 609 (Ex. F); COE 610-614 (Ex.
G); Tr. 164:1-19 (Mark). But Mark had not informed Jennifer of the Note and Deed of Trust; she
thought they were borrowing money directly from the Legacy Group and borrowing only
$312,000. Tr. 478:14-479:24, 733:1-12 (Jennifer). She refused to sign the documents. Id.; Tr.
536:12-24 (Jennifer); COE 504 (Ex. 8). She and Mark left the title company.
c.

Jennifer signed the Note and Deed of Trust and closed on the Hayden
Lake house on September 4.

Jennifer and Mark testified they called Joe Mijich. Tr. 165:25-166:19 (Mark); 481:7-19
(Jennifer). Mark thought Joe was acting as his attorney. Tr. 170:7-13 (Mark). According to
Mark, Joe told him the Note had to be $648,500 because his parents were responsible for the
Legacy Group loan and that “as soon as you pay off the $648,500 loan with the Legacy Group …
the house in Idaho is yours free and clear, no question about it, your parents have already stated
that to me.” Tr. 168:1-22 (Mark). Whether it was true that the Hayden Lake house would be
Mark’s if he paid off the Legacy Group loan was disputed, but no matter, it did not happen. As
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explained later, Annie and Tony paid off the Legacy Group loan.
Mark then testified that Joe told him there was another way he would own the Hayden
Lake house free and clear. According to Mark, Joe said: “when the Woodinville house sells, that
will pay off the $648,500 and you will owe nothing else on the loan.” Tr. 169:11-15 (Mark).
Jennifer testified similarly: “Joe said that the amount needed to match the loan from Legacy, and
when the Woodinville house sold, the Legacy loan would be paid for in full and the house would
be ours free and clear.” Tr. 481:20-482:9 (Jennifer).
While Joe recalled speaking with Mark earlier on September 3, 2014, he denied this
telephone call occurred. COE 214:7-215:25 (Mijich Dep.). He also denied saying Mark and
Jennifer would own the Hayden Lake house outright once the Woodinville house sold and the
Legacy Group loan was repaid. COE 233:7-234:9, 242:3-243:10 (Mijich Dep.). Such an
arrangement was also news to Kim Parker, Joe’s paralegal. Tr. 981:17-982:15, 983:25-984:24
(Parker). Kalyn too. Tr. 1162:7-19, 1164:16-1165:14, 1206:16-21 (Kalyn). According to Kalyn,
the parties expected the amount due under the Note to eventually be adjusted. Tr. 1164:161165:14, 1329:10-1330:4 (Kalyn). Joe testified the same. COE 261:25-268:19 (Mijich Dep.).
The next day Jennifer signed the Note and Deed of Trust, and she and Mark closed on the
Hayden Lake house. See COE 609 (Ex. F), 613 (Ex. F), 688 (Ex. U). To do so, they accepted
$312,044.32 from Annie and Tony. COE 688 (Ex. U); Tr. 160:22-161:10 (Mark). A warranty
deed in Mark and Jennifer’s names was recorded the same day. COE 506 (Ex. 10). So was the
Deed of Trust. COE 610 (Ex. G).
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d.

Annie and Tony gave Mark the $48,677 distributed from the Legacy
Group loan.

According to Mark, after the closing, he remembered Annie and Tony paying him the
$48,677 distribution they received from the Legacy Group loan. Tr. 157:11-22 (Mark). Kalyn
also confirmed that Annie and Tony gave Mark the distribution because the Legacy Group loan
was taken out for his and Jennifer’s benefit and they were liable for the loan through the Note, so
the funds went to them. Tr. 1167:19-1169:14, 1370:21-1371:11, 1392:3-15 (Kalyn).
At trial, there was also evidence that Mark received two checks totaling $45,000 from
Annie as reimbursement for the down payment on the Hayden Lake house. Tr. 1167:19-1168:14,
1392:3-15 (Kalyn); COE 700 (Ex. W). Mark denied that. Tr. 325:1-4 (Mark). The district court
believed Mark and found that Annie and Tony never repaid Mark for the down payment on the
Hayden Lake house. R. 468-469. But at trial, there was no evidence to refute Mark’s admission
that he received a $48,677.62 distribution from Annie and Tony.
8.

Mark arranged for Annie and Tony to take out two additional loans to pay
off the Legacy Group loan.
a.

Annie and Tony obtained a $480,000 mortgage on the Woodinville
house to pay down the Legacy Group loan.

November 29, 2014, the due date for the Note, came and went without the Note being
repaid. Tr. 421:1-7 (Mark); Tr. 501:12-14, 751:22-24 (Jennifer). The Legacy Group loan had
been extended. Tr. 421:5-13 (Mark). Mark and Jennifer separated again, and Mark moved out of
the Hayden Lake house. Tr. 484:9-17 (Jennifer). In April 2015, Jennifer filed for divorce. Tr.
484:25-485:3 (Jennifer). The Woodinville house still had not sold. Tr. 179:6-8 (Mark).
According to Mark, he paid all the interest-only payments on the Legacy Group loan and
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Note. Tr. 181:1 1-20, 217:1 1-219: 11 (Mark). But

documented
account,

MP1 accounting ledger.

in a

Mark made

interest

Mark also

Tr. 217:1 1-219111 (Mark).

payments from October 2014

May, and June, and made a payment

testiﬁed that the payments were

in July 2015.

COE

to

From

March 2015,

543 (EX.

his

MP1 business

failed to

18); see also Tr.

pay

in April,

1274:17-21

(Kalyn); Tr. 22027-225: 14 (Mark).

Needless t0 say,

Mark was having

difﬁculty paying the extremely high interest payments.

Tr. 1177:3-1 178:7, 1189:2-18 (Kalyn); Tr. 179:6-16 (Mark).

t0

Mark arranged

for

Annie and Tony

reﬁnance the Woodinville house with a new loan issued by Evergreen Moneysource Mortgage

Company (Evergreen)

pay down the Legacy Group

t0

115 :9 (Rerucha Dep.). Kalyn was

working for

still

loan. Tr. 17929-18027 (Mark);

MP1

COE

114:6-

and helped Annie and Tony obtain the

loan. Tr. 1176:16-1 177:6 (Kalyn).

On May

15,

2015, Evergreen issued the

new

loan to Annie and

Tony

(the First

m), which was a $480,000 conventional mortgage 0n the house. COE 534-536 (EX.
paying closing costs ($7,979.55), Annie and Tony used the proceeds t0 pay

Group loan

t0 $193,398.12.

(Rerucha Dep.).

(EX. 14); Tr. 180:22-181210 (Mark);

Had Mark not missed

would have been reduced
in this loan.

COE 537

t0 $ 1 76,500.

interest

payments and

Although

still

Evergreen
14).

After

down the Legacy

COE

115: 17-1 16:21

late fees, the principal

balance

married to Mark, Jennifer was not involved

See Tr. 600:8-601 :22 (Jennifer).
b.

During

Annie and Tony obtained a $417,000 mortgage 0n the Via Venito
house, which paid off the Legacy Group loan.

this time,

Mark was

trying to purchase a property in Bellevue, Washington, Tr.
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182:

1

1-25 (Mark), that he believed he could turn around for a substantial proﬁt, Tr. 785: 12-

78723 (Tony); Tr. 118 1
in the property

:

1

8-1 182:3, 1203:10-1206: 13 (Kalyn).

and needed around $400,000

185: 16-186z3, 314222-315:

the Bellevue property,

1,

to

Mark had

invested a lot of money

complete the purchase. See Tr. 182:1 1-25,

356:20-357212 (Mark); Tr. 1181:15-1 182:9 (Kalyn). Once he sold

Mark planned to pay Annie and Tony back

all

the

money he owed them.

Tr. 1182:10-23, 1185:25-1 187215, 119025-10, Tr. 1284:7-18, 130925-13 10:1,

1408:22-1409:4

(Kalyn); Tr. 784:17-788z22, 85327-865210 (Tony).

Mark convinced Annie and Tony to

take out a second loan from Evergreen, this one a

$417,000 mortgage 0n the Via Venito house (the Second Evergreen
(Mark); Tr. 790:7-792:3 (Tony).

By this

time,

Annie and Tony had found a buyer

Woodinville house, and Mark hoped the house would

With Kalyn’s
(Kalyn);

COE 538

sell

Annie and Tony’s debts be

assistance,

for the

before the Second Evergreen loan

The Second Evergreen loan closed

closed; that did not happen. Tr. 183220-25 (Mark).

the conditions required that

loan). Tr. 18 1 221-18323

ﬁrst,

and

paid. Tr. 183:20-184:4 (Mark).

Annie and Tony obtained the

loan. Tr. 1185:24-1 186:

(EX. 15). After closing costs, the loan paid off the mortgage on

1

8

Annie and

Tony’s personal residence, their credit card, and a credit card held by Mark that Annie had
cosigned.

COE 538

(EX. 15);

COE 711

(EX.

AA);

Tr. 79027-79223 (Tony); Tr.

241223-243118

(Mark); Tr. 1194:2-14, 1195:6-1 197:5 (Kalyn). The loan also paid off the rest 0f the Legacy

Group

loan,

which by that time amounted

t0 $198,020.17.

COE 712

(EX.

AA);

Tr.

183214-16

(Mark). Jennifer was not involved in this loan either. See Tr. 60028-601 :22 (Jennifer).

Because Mark needed the money from the Second Evergreen loan for the Bellevue
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property, Annie and Tony transferred the remainder of the loan—$116,494—to Mark, as well as
$52,382.07 for the proceeds used to pay off Annie and Tony’s mortgage and credit card. Tr.
188:21-189:6, 191:17-192:5, 241:23-244:18, 314:1-13 (Mark); Tr. 791:2-792:18 (Tony); Tr.
1198:2-15, 1285:10-24, 1358:23-1359:7 (Kalyn); COE 616 (Ex. O); COE 711 (Ex. AA). COE
717 (Ex. FF); COE 617 (Ex. P). Mark arranged for the Legacy Group to hold that money for the
seller of the Bellevue property. Tr. 1486:14-23 (Mark); Tr. 1209:14-17, 1359:8-15 (Kalyn).
By this time, Annie and Tony had moved from a single $270,000 conventional mortgage
on the Woodinville house to a high interest, short-term loan of $648,500 (the Legacy Group
loan), then to two conventional mortgages of $480,000 (the First Evergreen loan on the
Woodinville house) and $417,000 (the Second Evergreen loan on the Via Venito house) to pay
the Legacy Group loan off. Annie and Tony still expected Mark and Jennifer to repay the loan
they received from the Hayden Lake house and the associated fees. Tr. 846:2-850:16 (Tony).
9.

The Woodinville house eventually sold for $690,000.

Two weeks later, the Woodinville house finally sold for $690,000.00. See COE 731 (Ex.
NN). Of the proceeds, just under $49,000 were sales commissions and other fees and
$483,957.00 was distributed to Evergreen to pay off the First Evergreen loan. COE 732-733 (Ex.
NN). That left a check for $157,157.40, which Mark convinced Tony to transfer to him to
complete the purchase of the Bellevue property. COE 716 (Ex. EE); Tr. 204:18-205:2 (Mark);
Tr. 768:21-770:9, 785:12-787:3, 860:11-861:19 (Tony); Tr. 1201:24-1204:12 (Kalyn). Kalyn
deposited the check into Mark’s MPI business account. Tr. 1207:19-1209:6 (Kalyn).
The $157,157.40 was added to the previous amounts the Legacy Group had already
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collected—$116,494.25 and $52,382.07—for Mark to buy the Bellevue property. COE 615 (Ex.
N); Tr. 313:23-315:4 (Mark); Tr. 1209:18-1210:24, 1212:21-1213:17 (Kalyn). According to
Tony, none of that money was a gift, and Mark “indicated at the outset that he would definitely
pay us.” Tr. 770:10-19, 775:7-12, 781:8-783:5 (Tony). Kalyn testified the same. Tr. 1288:41289:15 (Kalyn).
But when Mark sold the Bellevue property for nearly $1.6 million, he did not repay them.
Tr. 416:9-417:10 (Mark); Tr. 1289:23-1290:20, 1366:8-1367:4 (Kalyn). Mark never repaid any
of the principal on the Note. Tr. 417:4-7 (Mark). Nor did Jennifer. Tr. 501:12-14, 751:22-24
(Jennifer). The mortgage on the Via Venito house also remains outstanding. Tr. 245:19-25
(Mark); Tr. 1293:1-10 (Kalyn). Mark and Jennifer’s divorce was finalized in December 2017.
COE 509 (Ex. 12). Jennifer was awarded the Hayden Lake house, and Mark was ordered to pay
all the community obligations. See COE 532 (Ex. 12).
10.

Tony and Annie commenced non-judicial foreclosure proceedings against the
Hayden Lake house.

In 2015, Mark called Joe Mijich asking that his parents foreclose on the Hayden Lake
house because Jennifer had not repaid the Note. COE 310:17-311:6, 311:22-312:5 (Mijich Dep.).
While Mark denied this, Tr. 257:7-17 (Mark), Kim Parker testified to having a similar
conversation with Mark. Tr. 985:18-987:5 (Parker). Joe called Tony, who gave the go-ahead to
foreclose. COE 313:3-16, 315:20-316:7 (Mijich Dep.).
In June 2016, Annie and Tony issued a notice of default, commenced non-judicial
foreclosure proceedings against the Hayden Lake house, and scheduled the sale of the property
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for October 2016. COE 747 (Ex. NNN). On October 5, 2016, Jennifer commenced this action,
seeking to enjoin the foreclosure and a declaratory ruling that she was not in default under the
Note. R. 23-35. The parties stipulated to terminate the non-judicial foreclosure, proceed with a
judicial foreclosure, and dismiss Jennifer’s claim for injunctive relief. R. 144.
Annie and Tony answered and filed a counterclaim against Jennifer and a thirdparty
complaint against Mark, seeking judicial foreclosure on the Hayden Lake house because the
payments required by the Note were past due. R. 146-156. Jennifer and Mark answered that
claim. R. 166, 173. Annie and Tony filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district
court denied. R. 207-216. Later, the district court partially granted Annie and Tony’s motion to
reconsider a ruling made on summary judgment. R. 260-261.
The district court held an eight-day court trial on April 23-26 and May 21-24, 2018, and
issued a decision in favor of Mark and Jennifer in August 2018. R. 453-478. The district court
found the Note and Deed of Trust were latently ambiguous and that Mark and Jennifer had no
obligation under the Note once the Woodinville house sold and the Legacy Group loan was paid.
R. 471-478. From there, the district court concluded that Mark and Jennifer were not in default
under the Note and Annie and Tony could not foreclose on the Deed of Trust.
The district court entered a judgment on September 6, 2018. R. 480-482. On October 12,
2018, Annie and Tony appealed. R. 484-488. On December 10, the district court granted Mark
and Jennifer their attorney fees. R. 505-517. The district court entered an amended judgment on
December 19, R. 519-521, and a corrected amended judgment on December 21, R. 523-525. On
December 31, 2018, Annie and Tony filed an amended notice of appeal. R. 527-535.

-23-

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
This appeal ultimately asks whether the district court erred in concluding that Mark and
Jennifer satisfied their obligations under the Note and that Annie and Tony were not entitled to
foreclose on the Deed of Trust. Within that overreaching issue are the following issues:
1.

Did the district court err in considering parol evidence to interpret and add

conditions to the Note and Deed of Trust when the contracts were not latently ambiguous?
2.

Is the district court’s interpretation of the parties’ intent under the Note and Deed

of Trust supported by substantial and competent evidence when Mark and Jennifer’s windfall
leads to an implausible result and is inconsistent with the court’s findings of fact?
3.

Did the district court err in finding that the Deed of Trust does not cover future

advances when it expressly secured future loans and advances made to Mark and Jennifer while
they owned the Hayden Lake house?
4.

Are Annie and Tony entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a trial court’s decision following a court trial, the Court’s review is
limited to determining “whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the
findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med.
Inv’r, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 714, 330 P.3d 1067, 1072 (2014) (citation omitted). As the trier of
fact, the trial court weighs conflicting evidence and judges witnesses’ credibility. Id. The trial
court’s findings of fact “will be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered,”
id. (citation omitted), and will not be set aside unless “clearly erroneous,” I.R.C.P. 52(a)(7).
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To determine if the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous, the Court “inquires
whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence.” Opportunity,
L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 605, 38 P.3d 1258, 1261 (2002) (citation omitted).
“Evidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it
in determining whether a disputed point of fact had been proven.” Id. It has also been stated that
“a factual finding will not be deemed clearly erroneous unless, after reviewing the entire record,
an appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” State,
Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Roe, 139 Idaho 18, 21, 72 P.3d 858, 861 (2003).
The Court exercises free review over the trial court’s conclusions of law. Pocatello, 156
Idaho at 714, 330 P.3d at 1072. In doing so, the Court determines “whether the court correctly
stated the applicable law, and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found.” Id.
Thus the Court can draw its own conclusions from the facts. Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148,
151, 953 P.2d 588, 591 (1998).
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The district court erred in considering parol evidence to interpret the Note and
Deed of Trust and to add entirely new conditions.
Mark and Jennifer repaid none of the principal owed on the Note. Nevertheless, the

district court concluded they were not in default because the parties intended the Note and Deed
of Trust to be satisfied, and for Mark and Jennifer to own the Hayden Lake house “free and
clear,” when the Woodinville home sold and the Legacy Group loan was paid in full. R. 473-478.
The Note and Deed of Trust, however, contain no such conditions. COE 609 (Ex. F), 610-614
(Ex. G). The district court’s legal analysis was wrong.
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The district court justified adding the new conditions because the Note and Deed of Trust
were latently ambiguous. But there is no uncertainty in Mark and Jennifer’s promise to pay
$648,500. To be sure, the district court did not interpret or explain the meaning of any language
in the Note and Deed of Trust. It simply added entirely new conditions that the parties did not
include in their writings. The district court’s use of parol evidence to add conditions under the
guise of interpreting an ambiguous contract defies Idaho law.
1.

The district court sought to interpret the Note and Deed of Trust on the basis
that the contracts were latently ambiguous.

Under the parol evidence rule, the writing supersedes all previous understandings,
negotiations, and agreements, and the parties’ intent must be ascertained from the writing.
Valley Bank v. Christensen, 119 Idaho 496, 498, 808 P.2d 415, 417 (1991). Thus, when a
contract has been reduced to writing and is intended to be a complete agreement, any other
understandings or written or oral agreements are not admissible to vary, contradict, or enlarge the
terms of the written contract. Id. The parol evidence rule, however, does not apply where an
ambiguity is present, where the writing is not completely integrated, or where fraud or mutual
mistake is alleged. Id.; see also Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 455, 259 P.3d 595,
601 (2011); 11 Williston on Contracts § 33:2, Westlaw (4th ed., database updated July 2019).
Here the district court considered parol evidence after finding the Note and Deed of Trust
were latently ambiguous. R. 472. The district court did not justify using parol evidence because
the contracts were unintegrated agreements. Compare R. 471-473 with Nysingh v. Warren, 94
Idaho 384, 385, 488 P.2d 355, 356 (1971) (“Whether a particular subject of negotiation is
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embodied in the writing depends on the intent of the parties, revealed by their conduct and
language, and by the surrounding circumstances.”). Nor did the district court find fraud or
mutual mistake. See R. 471-473. Rather, the district court sought to interpret the Note and Deed
of Trust to resolve a perceived ambiguity to determine the parties’ intent. See R. 471-477. It did
not find that the parties entered into a separate agreement modifying the contracts. See id.
2.

The Note and Deed of Trust are not latently ambiguous.
a.

The district court pointed to no language in the Note or Deed of Trust
that is reasonably susceptible to a conflicting interpretation.

The interpretation of a contract begins with its language. Knipe Land, 151 Idaho at 454,
259 P.3d at 600. In the absence of an ambiguity, determining the contract’s meaning and legal
effect is a question of law, and the contract “must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper
sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording.” Id. Whether an ambiguity
exists in a contract is also a question of law for the Court. Id. at 455, 259 P.3d at 601.
A contract term is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations
or if there are no reasonable interpretations (i.e., the language is nonsensical). Id. There are two
types of ambiguity: patent and latent. Id. “A patent ambiguity is an ambiguity clear from the face
of the instrument in question.” Id. “A latent ambiguity exists where an instrument is clear on its
face but loses that clarity when applied to the facts as they exist.” Id. A mere difference in the
parties’ interpretation of the contract, however, does not create an ambiguity. Swanson v. Beco
Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63-64, 175 P.3d 748, 752-53 (2007).
While a latent ambiguity can be found to arise under the facts of a case, the contract must
still contain a term that has different but reasonable meanings. See, e.g., Snoderly v. Bower, 30
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Idaho 484, 166 P. 265 (1917) (finding term “government rule” was latently ambiguous in
contract that required hay “to be measured according to government rule”). An example of a
latent ambiguity is “[w]here a writing contains a reference to an object or thing, such as a pump,
and it is shown by extrinsic evidence that there are two or more things or objects, such as pumps,
to which it might properly apply.” Williams v. Idaho Potato Starch Co., 73 Idaho 13, 20, 245
P.2d 1045, 1048-49 (1952) (finding “a ten inch pump” was latently ambiguous).
Another example of a latent ambiguity is found in Cool v. Mountainview Landowners
Co-operative Association, where a written easement allowed certain landowners to use a beach
area “for swimming and boating only.” 139 Idaho 770, 772, 86 P.3d 484, 486 (2004). The
landowner subject to the easement interpreted “swimming” strictly “to propel oneself through
water,” while the benefiting landowners argued the term was ambiguous. Id. at 773, 86 P.3d at
487 (citation omitted). Under the facts of the case, the Court found “swimming” latently
ambiguous because interpreting the term strictly would lead to illogical results. Id. It would
preclude activities that accompany swimming, such as resting on the beach, standing in the
water, or monitoring swimming children. Id.
Here the district court found the Note and Deed of Trust contained a latent ambiguity. R.
472. But unlike in Snoderly, Williams, and Cool, the district court did not identify any term in the
contracts that objectively held more than one meaning. See id. Instead, it concluded the Note and
Deed of Trust were latently ambiguous “because the principal amount due under the Note is
more than double the amount Mark and Jennifer needed to purchase the subject property.” Id.
That, according to the district court, “did not make sense.” Id. The district court erred in finding
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the contracts were ambiguous on that basis. It pointed to no term that was uncertain or that was
reasonably susceptible to differing interpretations. Id.
The only term that may be inferred to have been ambiguous was Mark and Jennifer’s
promise to pay $648,500. But even assuming that was the district court’s finding, the court still
erred. Under the Note, Mark and Jennifer agreed to the following:
For value received, the undersigned (“Marker”), jointly and
severally, promise to pay to the order of Anthony J. Porcello and
Annie C. Porcello, husband and wife (“Holder”), the principal sum
of Six Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and
No Cents ($648,500.00) in lawful money of the United States of
America with interest thereon.
COE 609 (Ex. F). The Deed of Trust also references the Note and Mark and Jennifer’s
indebtedness “in the sum of Six Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and No
Cents ($648,500.00).” COE 610 (Ex. G).
The parties are presumed to have intended what the terms clearly state. Swanson, 145
Idaho at 64, 175 P.3d at 753. There is nothing uncertain about Mark and Jennifer’s promise to
pay $648,500. The natural and ordinary meaning of a promise to pay $648,500 is a promise to
pay $648,500. That language is plain and only one interpretation is possible. See Charles R. Tips
Family Tr. v. PB Commercial LLC, 459 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex. App. 2015) (“The phrase ‘one
million seven thousand and no/100 dollars’ has a plain, unambiguous meaning, namely the sum
of $1,007,000.00.”). As a result, the Note and the Deed of Trust must be given their plain
meaning. See Knipe Land, 151 Idaho at 456, 259 P.3d at 602.
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b.

The perceived unfairness of the Note and Deed of Trust cannot be the
grounds for finding a latent ambiguity.

Knipe Land illustrates the district court’s error. There, a property broker entered into an
employment contract with the owners of agricultural land to sell the land. Id. at 452-53, 259 P.3d
at 598-99. The broker was entitled to a 5% commission after closing a sale. Id. The employment
contract also included the following provision: “Should a deposit or amounts paid on account of
purchase be forfeited, one-half thereof may be retained by you, as the Broker, as the balance
shall be paid to me [the owners].” Id. at 452, 259 P.3d at 598. Another provision stated “[t]he
Broker’s share of any forfeited deposit or amounts paid on account of purchase, however, shall
not exceed the commission.” Id.
Two contracts for sale of the land fell through, which resulted in the prospective buyers
forfeiting earnest money. Id. at 452-53, 259 P.3d at 598-99. When the owners failed to pay the
broker its share of the forfeited funds, the broker sued to enforce the employment contract. Id. at
453, 259 P.3d at 599. The owners argued the contract was latently ambiguous because the
broker’s share of the forfeited funds would result in an absurd or unjust result. See id. at 456, 259
P.3d at 602. The owners pointed to evidence that the broker would have to split the 5%
commission evenly with the buyer’s broker after closing a sale. Id. They argued that it made no
sense for the broker to earn more under a forfeiture (i.e., a failed sale) than under a successful
sale, where the broker had to split the commission. Id.
The Court concluded that such a result did not render the employment contract absurd or
latently ambiguous and that the district court should have ruled that the contract was
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unambiguous as a matter of law. Id. The split of commissions between the broker and a buyer’s
broker was a third-party agreement, and the broker’s entitlement to forfeited money “does
nothing to suggest that the parties intended for the provision of the [employment contract] to
mean anything other than what it plainly says.” Id. Further, the Court noted that the resulting
“absurdity” alleged by the owners was different than the absurdity in Cool (if “swimming” had
been strictly interpreted). Id.
Knipe Land illustrates that latent ambiguities do not arise simply because a contract does
not seem reasonable or fair. Adults are presumed capable of managing their affairs, and “whether
a bargain is smart or foolish, or economically efficient or disastrous, is not ordinarily a legitimate
subject of judicial inquiry. If freedom of contract means anything, it means that parties may
make even foolish bargains and should be held to their terms.” 11 Williston on Contracts § 31:5
(footnote omitted). Simply because a contract is “unfair under the circumstances” does not give
the court “the roving power to rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable” under a
claim of ambiguity. Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 143, 106 P.3d 465, 469 (2005) (finding
contract was not ambiguous and was properly interpreted by its terms despite inequity of term).
The circumstances here align with those in Knipe Land, where a latent ambiguity did not
arise, not those in Cool, where a latent ambiguity did arise. The broker’s ability to earn more on
a failed sale than a successful sale did not mean the employment contract could be read more
than one way. Knipe Land, 151 Idaho at 456, 259 P.3d at 602. Likewise, the district court’s view
that the amount of the Note did not make sense or was unjust does not suggest that the parties
intended the Note and Deed of Trust to mean anything other than what the contracts plainly say.
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c.

The district court erred in using parol evidence to interpret the Note
and Deed of Trust to include new conditions.

The district court’s error can also be shown another way. The court did not offer any
different meaning to Mark and Jennifer’s promise to pay “the principal sum of Six Hundred
Forty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and No Cents ($648,500.00) in lawful money of the
United States of America with interest thereon” or any other term in the Note or Deed of Trust
See R. 472. Rather, under the guise of interpreting the contracts, the district court added
conditions that released Jennifer and Mark from their obligation to pay $648,500 based entirely
on the disputed testimony of Mark and Jennifer. R. 473-474. The district court’s interpretation of
the alleged ambiguity materially changed the contracts and undermines the finding of an
ambiguous term and is an improper use of parol evidence.
An ambiguity requires the court to interpret the uncertain term; it does not give the court
authority to rewrite the parties’ contract. See 11 Williston on Contracts § 31:5 (ambiguity does
not give court authority to “make a new contract for the parties or rewrite their contract while
purporting to interpret or construe it”). Parol evidence is used only “to determine what the parties
intended the ambiguous terms to mean” or “what was intended by the ambiguous statement.”
Snoderly, 30 Idaho at 488, 166 P. at 265-66; see also Matter of Estate of Kirk, 127 Idaho 817,
824, 907 P.2d 794, 801 (1995) (“Parol evidence may be considered to aid a trial court in
determining the intent of the drafter of a document if an ambiguity exists.”).
Thus in Cool, the court ascribed meaning to “swimming” based on the surrounding
circumstances. 139 Idaho at 773, 86 P.3d at 487. In Snoderly, the court gave meaning to
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“government rule.” 30 Idaho at 488, 166 P. at 266. In Williams, to remove the latent ambiguity in
“a ten inch pump,” the Court looked to “extrinsic evidence to show which type of pump the
description related to.” 73 Idaho at 19-20, 245 P.2d at 104849. As those decisions demonstrate,
parol evidence is “admitted to explain a latent ambiguity, it cannot do more; a latent ambiguity
does not justify the admission of evidence designed to vary or contradict the writing.” 32A C.J.S.
Evidence § 1515, Westlaw (database updated June 2019). A court cannot “by a process of
interpretation relieve one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily consented to; nor can
courts interpret an agreement to mean something the contract does not itself contain.” McCallum
v. Campbell-Simpson Motor Co., 82 Idaho 160, 166, 349 P.2d 986, 990 (1960).
Here, the district court did just that. It used the self-interested and disputed testimony of
Mark and Jennifer to add new and material terms to the Note and Deed of Trust, not to resolve
any ambiguity in the contracts’ terms. The parol evidence rule’s legal preference towards
writings arises from a distrust of parol evidence and the desire to ensure contracting parties
cannot vary the terms of their writings as a result of “miscommunication, poor memory, fraud, or
perjury.” 11 Williston on Contracts § 33:1. The danger of parol evidence is fraud or fabrication,
which can be countered by evidence of writings. Nysingh, 94 Idaho at 386, 488 P.2d at 357.
Evidence establishing a latent ambiguity cannot come from “self-serving testimony of one party
to the contract as to what the contract …‘really’ means.” Coffin v. Bowater Inc., 501 F.3d 80, 98
(1st Cir. 2007) (ellipsis in original; citation omitted).
In the end, the district court did not consider parol evidence to explain or give meaning to
the amount of the Note or Mark and Jennifer’s promise to pay but rewrote the Note and Deed of
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Trust. Accepting Mark and Jennifer’s testimony of what Joe Mijich allegedly told them, the
district court found they had no obligation to repay the Note, and would own the Hayden Lake
house “free and clear,” if the Woodinville home sold and the Legacy Group loan was repaid. R.
477. The district court erred adding conditions that were never expressed in the Note and Deed
of Trust under the guise of interpreting the contracts.
3.

Idaho Code § 28-3-117 does not allow the district court to interpret and add
conditions to the Note and Deed of Trust with parol evidence.

The district court also relied on Idaho Code § 28-3-117 to justify using parol evidence to
interpret the Note and Deed of Trust. R. 472-473. Section 28-3-117, however, is not a basis to
consider parol evidence under the circumstances here and does not allow modifying the Note and
Deed of Trust with new conditions.
a.

Section 28-3-117 does not allow for the admission of parol evidence to
interpret the Note and Deed of Trust.

The Note is a negotiable instrument under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
See Idaho Code § 28-3-104(1) (defining “negotiable instrument”). Section 28-3-117 allows an
obligor under a note to raise, as a defense to the obligation, evidence of a “separate agreement”
that modifies or supplements the obligation:
Subject to applicable law regarding exclusion of proof of
contemporaneous or previous agreements, the obligation of a party to an
instrument to pay the instrument may be modified, supplemented or nullified by a
separate agreement of the obligor and a person entitled to enforce the instrument,
if the instrument is issued or the obligation is incurred in reliance on the
agreement or as part of the same transaction giving rise to the agreement. To the
extent an obligation is modified, supplemented or nullified by an agreement under
this section, the agreement is a defense to the obligation.
I.C. § 28-3-117. Reasoning that the provision “provides that other agreements may be considered
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when interpreting a negotiable instrument,” the district court found it could “consider extrinsic
evidence to interpret the Note and Deed of Trust based on the significant difference between the
purchase price and the amount needed to close the purchase on the one hand and the Note and
Deed of Trust on the other hand.” R. 472-473.
There are several reasons why section 28-3-117 did not give the district court a basis to
rely on parol evidence to add conditions to the Note and Deed of Trust. First, section 28-3-117 is
“[s]ubject to applicable law regarding exclusion of proof of contemporaneous or previous
agreements” and thus the parol evidence rule. See also I.C. § 28-3-117 cmt. 2. As already
addressed, the district court erred finding the Note and Deed of Trust were latently ambiguous
and relying on parol evidence to interpret the contracts. Thus the district court cannot rely on
section 28-3-117 to consider extrinsic evidence that is otherwise improper.
Second, the district court did not actually apply section 28-3-117. The district court made
no factual findings or legal conclusions that the parties entered into a “separate agreement” for
Mark and Jennifer to take the Hayden Lake house free and clear when the Woodinville house
sold and the Legacy Group loan was paid. Nor did the district court find a separate agreement
that served as a “defense” to their obligation to pay the Note. Rather, the district court relied on
Mark and Jennifer’s “understanding” to interpret the Note and Deed of Trust to include the
conditions. R. 473. Section 28-3-117 does not give the district court such authority.
Third, interpreting new conditions into the Note, as the district court did, would render
the Note no longer a negotiable instrument under Article 3 and no longer subject to section 28-3117. To constitute a negotiable instrument, a writing must be “an unconditional promise or order
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to pay a fixed amount of money.” I.C. §§ 28-3-104(1), 28-3-106. The district court’s
interpretation that the Note and Deed of Trust would be satisfied once the Woodinville house
sold and the Legacy Group loan was paid adds conditions to the payment of the Note, taking it
outside of Article 3 and section 28-3-117. See R. 477.
b.

The statute of frauds precludes an oral, separate agreement under
section 28-3-117.

Even if the district court had found that Mark and Jennifer reached a “separate
agreement” with Annie and Tony on the payment of the Note, such an agreement would violate
the statute of frauds and is invalid. Adding conditions to the Note and Deed of Trust to allow
Mark and Jennifer to take the Hayden Lake house when the Woodinville home sold and the
Legacy Group loan was repaid are essential unwritten terms relating to an interest in real
property. Idaho’s statute of frauds in Idaho Code § 9-503 forbids that. The provision provides:
No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not
exceeding one (1) year, nor any trust or power over or concerning it, or in any
manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or
declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other instrument
in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
I.C. § 9-503. “Because a deed of trust is an interest in real property, it falls under the terms of
I.C. § 9-503.” Ogden v. Griffith, 149 Idaho 489, 493, 236 P.3d 1249, 1253 (2010). And because
the Note and Deed of Trust are intertwined, the Note also falls with the statute.
Ogden illustrates why. There, two parties reached an oral settlement agreement that
required one party to pay a sum of money that was to be secured by a deed of trust. Id. at 491,
236 P.3d at 1251. The settlement agreement was never reduced to writing. Id. Because “the
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settlement agreement itself called for a deed of trust,” the Court held that the settlement
agreement was within Idaho Code § 9-503, and the settlement agreement “must be in writing.”
Id. at 493, 236 P.3d at 1253. Without a writing, the settlement agreement was not enforceable
absent some other exception. Id. at 494, 236 P.3d at 1254.
It is also true that a contract required by the statute of frauds to be in writing cannot be
materially modified by a subsequent oral agreement. 10 Williston on Contracts § 29:46, Westlaw
(4th ed., database updated July 2019); see also Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho 872, 811 P.2d 48 (Ct.
App. 1991) (holding oral modification of non-material terms to written real estate purchase
agreement need not be in writing to be enforceable under statute of frauds). That would be the
situation here if the district court found the new conditions formed a separate agreement under
section 28-3-117. Because the Note and Deed of Trust fall under the statute of frauds, a separate
agreement modifying Mark and Jennifer’s unconditional promise to pay must have been in
writing to be enforceable, and there was none.
4.

The district court erred in finding Mark and Jennifer were not in default.

Because there is no other reasonable interpretation of Mark and Jennifer’s promise to pay
$648,500, the district court erred in concluding that the Note and Deed of Trust were latently
ambiguous and in considering parol evidence to resolve the perceived ambiguity. When a
contract’s terms are unambiguous, the court cannot revise the contract to make a better
agreement for one of the parties. Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 997, 829 P.2d 1342, 1346
(1992). The district court should have enforced the Note and the Deed of Trust as written. And
based on the undisputed evidence, the court should have found Mark and Jennifer were in default
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under the Note. Finally, the court should have determined what Mark and/or Jennifer owed. In
doing none of those things, the district court erred.
B.

The district court’s interpretation of the parties’ intent under the Note and Deed of
Trust is not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Even if Mark and Jennifer’s promise to pay $648,500 is ambiguous, the district court still

erred because its determination of the parties’ intent and resolution of the ambiguity is not
supported by substantial and competent evidence. The district court found that it made sense for
Mark and Jennifer to walk off with a house they did not pay for once the Woodinville house was
sold and the Legacy Group loan repaid, despite having repaid none of the loan themselves. For
that to be true, Annie and Tony must have meant to gift Mark and Jennifer at least $312,044.32,
plus all of their equity in the Woodinville house. Mark and Jennifer’s windfall is an implausible
result and inconsistent with the district court’s findings regarding the Woodinville house, the
execution of the Note and Deed of Trust, and the Evergreen loans.
1.

The parties could not have intended for the Woodinville house, once sold, to
satisfy the debt owed on the Legacy Group loan.

Where the facts reveal a latent ambiguity, the courts seek to determine the parties’ intent
at the time they entered into the contract. Knipe Land, 151 Idaho at 455, 259 P.3d at 601. The
interpretation of an ambiguous contact is a question of fact. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho
611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006). The parties’ intent is to be determined by the objective and
purpose of the particular provision and the facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of
the contract. Id. The district court determination that the parties intended Mark and Jennifer’s
unconditional promise to pay $648,500 to mean a promise to pay $648,500 that would terminate
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when the Woodinville house was sold and the Legacy Group loan was repaid, no matter who
repaid it, is implausible and inconsistent with the record. See R. 477.
The district court reached that finding, in part, because the principal amount of the Note
was more than the amount needed to purchase the Hayden Lake home, the amount of the Note
matched the Legacy Group loan, the Legacy Group loan paid off the original mortgage on the
Woodinville house, and Mark and Jennifer understood the Hayden Lake house would be “free
and clear” when the Woodinville house sold and the Legacy Group loan was repaid. R. 473-477.
But that evidence only goes so far. And critically, it does not support the crux of the district
court’s finding: “Annie and Tony were not out-of-pocket on the Hayden transaction but
borrowed money to allow Jennifer and Mark to purchase the Hayden home” and “the loan Annie
and Tony obtained was paid.” R. 477.
Consider Mark and Jennifer’s understanding that the Woodinville house, once sold,
would pay off the Legacy Group loan. See R. 473-474. Based on the district court’s other
findings, that was not possible. From the beginning, it was known and understood that the equity
in the Woodinville house was not enough to cover the Legacy Group loan. See R. 461. The
Legacy Group loan was closed just before Mark and Jennifer signed the Note and Deed of Trust.
At that time, as the district court recognized, “[t]here was insufficient equity in the Woodinville
home by itself to secure” the Legacy Group loan. Id. Thus, the Legacy Group loan was secured
by the Woodinville house and the Via Venito house. Id.
The parties assumed the Woodinville house would sell quickly. R. 465. It makes no sense
then that the parties could expect the equity in the house to pay off the Legacy Group loan when
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it was insufficient to secure the loan in the first place. And of course, that was proven true. The
Woodinville house sold for $690,000. R. 466. As Mark acknowledged, even if the house had
sold for that amount, the proceeds from the sale would have been short of paying off the Legacy
Group loan. See Tr. 186:14-187:3, 205:18-23 (Mark).
There is also another finding that undermines the belief that the Woodinville house would
pay off the Legacy Group loan: the district court’s finding that the parties agreed to reconcile
their respective contributions to the Woodinville house once it sold. R. 464-465. Because that
was the deal, the proceeds surely could not have paid off the Legacy Group loan. Annie and
Tony would have recouped their equity in the Woodinville house after repaying Mark and
Jennifer for theirs, which the district court found was $150,000. R. 465. Prior to obtaining the
Legacy Group loan, that would have left Annie and Tony a great deal of equity after paying off
the $270,000 existing mortgage on the house. The math and the evidence simply do not support a
finding that the Woodinville house would pay off the Legacy Group loan.
2.

The district court failed to understand Annie and Tony’s financial outlay to
provide Mark and Jennifer the money for the Hayden Lake house.

The district court’s error in resolving the perceived ambiguity in the Note and Deed of
Trust, however, goes much deeper. Finding that the parties intended the Hayden Lake house to
be “free and clear” once the Legacy Group loan was paid represents a critical misunderstanding
of how Annie and Tony were able to provide Mark and Jennifer with at least $312,044.32 in the
first place and how the Legacy Group loan was actually paid.
The district court believed that Annie and Tony did not come “out-of-pocket on the
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Hayden transaction” and borrowed money to provide Mark and Jennifer with $312,044.32,
which was ultimately paid back. R. 477. As before, that understanding cannot be reconciled with
the district court’s recognition that Annie and Tony were entitled to their equity in the
Woodinville house once it sold, R. 464-465, that Annie and Tony unlocked their equity in the
Woodinville and Via Venito houses to secure the Legacy Group loan, R. 461, and that the loan
was ultimately paid off by Annie and Tony with additional loans on both houses, R. 465-466.
This is perhaps best illustrated by considering the circumstances as they existed,
according to the district court, before Annie and Tony obtained the Legacy Group loan. At that
time, the existing mortgage on the Woodinville house was just over $270,000. R. 461-462. If the
house sold for $690,000 (as it ultimately did), Annie and Tony’s proceeds would be around
$370,000 after paying off the existing mortgage and nearly $49,000 in selling fees. See, e.g.,
COE 714 (Ex. CC). Mark and Jennifer were entitled to $150,000 of those proceeds, R. 465,
which would leave Annie and Tony approximately $220,000 from the sale.
Then consider the Woodinville house when Mark and Jennifer signed the Note and Deed
of Trust, after the Legacy Group loan but before the First and Second Evergreen loans. To obtain
the Legacy Group loan, Annie and Tony replaced their old conventional mortgage with a new,
higher loan amount and interest rate and cashed out the equity in both the Woodinville and Via
Venito houses to do so. See R. 461-462. The Legacy Group loan included the old mortgage on
the Woodinville house, $17,315.50 in loan charges, $312,044.32 distributed to Mark and Jennifer
for the purchase of the Hayden Lake house, and $48,677.62, which Mark testified he also
received. See COE 692-698 (Ex. V); Tr. 157:11-22 (Mark).
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If the Woodinville house had sold quickly, and sold for $690,000, Annie and Tony would
have received $640,000 after nearly $49,000 in selling fees. See, e.g., COE 714 (Ex. CC).
Accepting Mark and Jennifer’s testimony, as the district court did, the parties intended those
proceeds to pay off the Legacy Group loan and once paid in full, Mark and Jennifer’s obligations
under the Note would be satisfied. See R. 463, 476-477. In other words, the parties meant for
Mark and Jennifer to take all the equity in the Woodinville house (plus equity in the Via Venito
house), and for Annie and Tony to take nothing and encumber themselves in new debt.
Such a windfall to Mark and Jennifer and injustice to Annie and Tony makes no sense if,
as the district court also found, Mark and Jennifer were only entitled to $150,000 out of Annie
and Tony’s equity in the Woodinville house once it sold. See R. 465. It is impossible to reconcile
the district court’s finding that Annie and Tony were entitled to their equity in the Woodinville
house and the finding that the parties intended Mark and Jennifer to own the Hayden Lake house
free and clear once the Legacy Group loan was repaid. Both cannot be true. Annie and Tony’s
equity in the Woodinville house was converted to the Legacy Group loan; it did not disappear.
Moving forward to the First Evergreen loan, the situation was no different. Annie and
Tony refinanced the Woodinville house and obtained a new $480,000 mortgage. R. 465. If the
house had sold for $690,000 then, Annie and Tony would have received around $160,000 after
selling fees and paying off the First Evergreen loan. But as before, under the district court’s
reading of the Note and Deed of Trust, Annie and Tony would have paid that money to the
Legacy Group loan and once paid in full, Mark and Jennifer would own the Hayden Lake house
free and clear—again leaving Annie and Tony with nothing but more debt. (In reality, Annie and
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Tony paid down the Legacy Group loan to $193,398.12 and gave $116,494 to Mark. See id.)
Finally, consider the Second Evergreen loan and the sale of the Woodinville house, and
what actually happened. Mark convinced Annie and Tony to obtain the Second Evergreen loan, a
$417,000 mortgage on the Via Venito house. R. 465-466. Mark planned to take all the proceeds
from this loan. R. 466. But when the loan closed, $198,020.17 went to pay off the Legacy Group
loan in full and the rest went to Mark. R. 466; COE 712 (Ex. AA); Tr. 183:14-16, 188:21-25
(Mark). Then the Woodinville house sold for $690,000. R. 466. After paying fees and the First
Evergreen loan, $157,157.40 remained, which again went to Mark because he had been shorted
proceeds from the Second Evergreen loan. R. 466.
At this point, Mark’s shell game had moved Annie and Tony’s equity in the Woodinville
and Via Venito houses from loan to loan to loan, and the Legacy Group loan was paid in full.
Annie and Tony had acquired three different loans, incurring significant fees, all to loan Mark
and Jennifer at least $312,044.32 to close the Hayden Lake house. But according to the district
court, the parties intended for Mark and Jennifer to own the Hayden Lake house free and clear,
and for their obligations under the Note and the Deed of Trust to be satisfied, once the Legacy
Group loan was paid in full, no matter who paid it.
That interpretation is not reasonable, leads to an illogical result, and fails to grasp what
Annie and Tony gave to provide Mark and Jennifer with at least $312,044.32. If the district
court’s interpretation were true, Annie and Tony intended to gift Mark and Jennifer the Hayden
Lake house, all of the equity in the Woodinville and Via Venito houses—not just $150,000 of the
equity in the Woodinville house—and the loan fees on the Legacy Group loan and the Evergreen
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loans incurred on their behalf. Mark and Jennifer presented no such evidence of Annie and
Tony’s intent. See Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Tr., 147 Idaho 117,
126, 206 P.3d 481, 490 (2009) (essential element of gift is manifested intent to make gift).
A reasonable trier of fact would not accept and rely on the findings made by the district
court in resolving the perceived ambiguity. At the very least, after reviewing this record, the
Court should be left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Thus, if
the Court finds the Note and Deed of Trust were latently ambiguous, the district court’s
determination of the parties’ intent should be reversed.
C.

The district court erred in finding the Deed of Trust does not cover future advances.
At trial, Annie and Tony argued that the Deed of Trust secured more than just Mark and

Jennifer’s indebtedness under the Note; it also secured future advances made to Mark and
Jennifer while they owned the Hayden Lake house. See R. 474-476. The district court disagreed
and found “there is no credible evidence” that the parties agreed that the Hayden Lake house
would secure advances such as the interest and late fees Annie and Tony paid on the Legacy
Group loan, the fees they paid to refinance the loan, and the money they gave Mark from the
Second Evergreen loan on the sale of the Woodinville house. R. 475-476.
The district court’s conclusion ignores the plain language of the Deed of Trust and the
validity of future advance clauses under Idaho law. “A future advance clause in a mortgage is a
provision stating that funds advanced by the mortgagee after the creation of the mortgage will be
secured by the mortgage.” 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 213, Westlaw (database updated June 2019).
Such clauses “are valid to extend the security to other existing indebtedness or to future
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indebtedness between the same parties.” Id. As the Court explained in Biersdorff v. Brumfield, 93
Idaho 569, 572, 468 P.2d 301, 304 (1970), “if the parties intended that there should be future
advances secured by the mortgage, that agreement protected the seniority of the lien for the
subsequent advances.”
The district court misread Biersdorff and failed to consider the plain language used in the
Deed of Trust. See R. 475-476. The Deed of Trust expressly provides security for Mark and
Jennifer’s indebtedness under the Note, as well as for any future loans or advancements made by
Annie and Tony for any purpose while Mark and Jennifer own the Hayden Lake house:
and to secure payment of all such further sums as may hereafter be
loaned or advanced by the Beneficiary herein to the Grantor
herein, or any or either of them, while record owner of present
interest, for any purpose, and of any notes, drafts or other
instruments representing such further loans, advances or
expenditures together with interest on all such sums at the rate
therein provided … it is the express intention of the parties to this
Deed of Trust that is shall stand as continuing security until paid
for all such advances together with interest thereon.
COE 610 (Ex. G) (emphases added). Despite the parties’ “express intention” that the Deed of
Trust “stand as continuing security” for “all such further sums as may hereafter be loaned or
advanced … for any purpose,” the district court ignored that language and even turned to parol
evidence without justifying its use. See R. 475-476.
Just like any other contract, the best evidence of the parties’ intent is the language of the
Deed of Trust. See Opportunity, 136 Idaho at 607, 38 P.3d at 1263 (“If possible, the intent of the
parties should be ascertained from the language of the agreement as the best indication of their
intent.”). The district court erred by ignoring the express language of the Deed of Trust. In
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t0
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on appeal under the Note and Deed of Trust.
award of attorney

fees, the

When a valid contract contains

fees.
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V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained, the Court should reverse the judgment of the

remand

for the court t0 apply the

in default

Note and Deed 0f Trust

as written,

district court

and

ﬁnd Mark and Jennifer were

under the Note, and determine the amount owed by Mark and Jennifer.
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